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Abstract: 
Reading Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric from a rhetorical perspective--as an attempt to address 
issues relevant to religious rhetoric--I argue that Campbell's aims of preparing future ministers to preach 
and defending the authority of revealed religion shaped, first, his conception of inventing and 
presenting emotional appeals and, second, his key assumptions about reason and passion. The essay 
adds a chapter to accounts of the relationship between reason and passion in sacred rhetorics and in 
rhetorical traditions more generally, and addresses the question of what Campbell's theory of rhetoric 
may aim to inculcate or cultivate emotionally and why. 
 
Text of paper: 
[I]f we would speak of Things as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and 
Clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing 
else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed 
are perfect cheat. (John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding) 
 
[W]hen I was dissuading the populace of Caesarea in Mauretania from civil war [. . .] I pleaded in the 
grand style in so far as I was able that they should cast forth from their hearts and customs such a 
ferocious and inveterate evil. But I did not think that I had done anything when I heard them applauding, 
but when I saw them weeping. [. . . T]ears indicated that they were persuaded. When I saw these, I 
believed that the terrible custom handed down by their fathers and grandfathers and from still more 
remote times, which had besieged their hearts like an enemy, or rather taken them, had been 
overcome, even before the victory had been demonstrated. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine) 
 
 These epigraphs indicate the contested status of emotional appeals in theories of rhetoric and in 
religious rhetoric. Locke's "almost pathological fear of religious emotion" (Cragg 10) contrasts sharply 
with St. Augustine's report of how his eloquence moved hearers to tears. For Augustine emotional 
appeals cure disorder; for Locke they cause it. Emotional appeals may be understood not only as 
instrumental in persuasion but also as inviting identification. They may aim to solicit emotional 
performances that mark an audience's consubstantiality with some collective and division from another. 
For example the more orthodox members of the Church of England in the eighteenth century could 
refuse to be moved by John Wesley's so-called fanatic manner of preaching--a style that appealed to 
workers in manufacturing towns outside of London. Thus emotional appeals are implicated in religious 
identity as well as sociopolitical power.1 
 Miller has asserted that "Every theory of discourse contains an epistemology, an ethics, and a 
politics, for every theory models what can be known, how people should respond, and what purposes 
are to be served" (223). Following Conley (ix), I view theories of rhetoric as arguments for what rhetoric 
ought to be and as responses to practical circumstances. Now, consider the case of George Campbell's 
Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), widely acknowledged to be a key text in rhetorical traditions. Campbell 
purports to present a universal theory of communication, seeming to locate discourse less in civic scenes 
such as the senate and bar than in faculties of mind such as reason and passion. The epistemological 
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orientation of this work probably accounts for the tendency of Campbell scholarship to focus on how 
Campbell addresses epistemological issues. In this essay I read Philosophy of Rhetoric from what may be 
described as a rhetorical perspective--as Campbell's attempt to address issues relevant to religious 
rhetoric including the place of emotional appeals in preaching and in scriptural interpretation. The essay 
focuses on two of Campbell's main religious activities--preparing future ministers to preach and 
defending the authority of revealed religion--and argues that these activities shaped, first, his 
conception of inventing and presenting emotional appeals and, second, his key assumptions about 
reason and passion.2 In doing so it aims to add a chapter to accounts of the relationship between reason 
and passion in sacred rhetorics and in rhetorical traditions more generally,3 and to address the more 
general question of what a theory of rhetoric--in this case Campbell's--may aim to inculcate or cultivate 
emotionally and why. Religion is an appropriate entrée into issues regarding emotional appeals in 
theories of rhetoric since the best explanation for why emotional appeals began to receive more 
attention in theories of rhetoric in the seventeenth century is "the rhetorical activity spawned by the 
Reformation and Counterreformation" (Conley 155) and since emotion is a central, perhaps the 
essential, feature of religion.4  
 In addition, this essay aims to contribute to our understanding of a touchstone in rhetorical 
traditions in three main ways. First, it considers whether Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric offers a 
theory of invention and, if so, what it is.5 Scholars have differed on the issue of whether he offers a 
theory of invention. Those who hold that he does have differed on issues such as whether it is an 
attenuation of classical systems or something fundamentally different. Here I argue that he offers a 
theory of inventing emotional appeals analogous to a classical "place" system of invention. Second, this 
essay complements broad explanations of Campbell's view of emotional appeals. Certainly "emerging 
democracy" helps to explain the surfacing of disagreements over basic values which, in turn, may have 
seemed to be better addressed by emotion than reason.6 Campbell's religious activities offer what may 
be described as a mid-level explanation that complements this broader explanation. Campbell's religious 
concerns were inextricably linked with concerns about social and political order. Third, this essay 
complements research on the sources of his rhetorical theory.7 No doubt a number of thinkers and 
circumstances shaped, are reflected in, and are consistent with Campbell's theory of rhetoric. David 
Hume's theory of human nature as well as his attack on miracles are probably the most significant of 
these influences. Given Campbell's vocation and publications, his religious purposes ought not to be 
discounted.8 Thus this study highlights the need to study theories of rhetoric in the contexts of an 
author's "other" works and practical concerns. 
 I first detail Campbell's arguments for a moderate preaching style and for a view of the Gospels 
as undesigned testimony--as reports of matters of fact--that reveal God's truths. I then argue that these 
positions shape Campbell's conception of emotional appeals as inventible and intimately connected with 
appeals to reason, as well as his assumptions that passion and reason are universal, passive faculties of 
mind. 
Campbell's Religious Purposes and Emotional Appeals 
 Because my argument assumes that Campbell was mindful of practical implications of his theory 
of rhetoric, I begin with two theoretical positions on the nature and status of emotional appeals that 
Campbell could have advocated but did not: use emotional appeals only or use appeals to reason only. 
Of course these positions could be and have been advocated by other thinkers addressing not only 
religious but other kinds of circumstances. And they are extremes more easily separated analytically 
than in practice. But they are always a live way to address the issue of whether rhetors ought to use 
emotional appeals. A theorist's arguments for or against these positions offer insight into the theorist's 
take on what the rhetorical forms and functions of emotional appeals ought to be in a given situation 
and why. 
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 First, Campbell could have advocated a theory of rhetoric holding that emotional appeals only or 
primarily should be used since reason is weak. Campbell apparently had reservations about the strength 
of the reasoning faculty in most members of a congregation. In his lectures on pulpit eloquence 
Campbell suggests that "the inferior ranks of people" are "the bulk of his audience" (372), that "the bulk 
of the people are unused to reading and study" (376), and that "the generality of hearers are very little 
capable" of too intense an application of thought (433). Likewise, in "An Address to the People of 
Scotland" he asserts that "[t]he bulk of mankind are more influenced by their passions, in forming their 
opinions, than by reason" (314). In his sermon on the spirit of the Gospel, in a moment of conciliatory 
language toward doctrinal opponents, Campbell asserts that "[t]he understanding is too generally the 
dupe of the passions; and we are easily brought to believe what would gratify a predominant 
inclination" (392). And in the sermon "The Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society" he asserts: "Let it 
not be pretended, that there is no danger from the reasonings of the sceptic, because these are far 
above the comprehension of vulgar understandings. For those men will fondly adopt the conclusion who 
are incapable of apprehending aught of the premisses. The authority of great names among the learned 
will ever be to them a sufficient foundation" (111). 
 Second, Campbell could have advocated a theory of rhetoric holding that appeals to reason only 
or primarily should be used because emotional appeals warp judgment. In both Philosophy of Rhetoric 
and "Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence," Campbell asserts that passion disturbs "the operation of the 
intellectual faculty" (Philosophy 2; "Pulpit" 401). In addition, for Campbell introducing knowledge before 
emotion is more natural so presumably more effective: "the progression from knowledge to faith, from 
faith to love, from love to obedience, is more conformable to the natural influence of things upon the 
human mind" (Systematic 170-1).9 There would be good precedent for preachers to focus on appeals to 
reason since "[t]he Lord Jesus Christ, the author of our religion, often argued, both with his disciples and 
with his adversaries, as with reasonable men, on the principles of reason. Without this faculty, he well 
knew, they could not be susceptible either of religion or of law" (Dissertation 1: 27). Moreover, for 
Campbell emotional appeals alone may be a verbal equivalent of force, and he wants belief to be 
properly earned; as he says in his lectures on ecclesiastical history: "By convincing your judgment, it shall 
powerfully operate upon your will, and make your duty to become your choice" (182). 
 Campbell's theory of mind helps to explain why he can abandon neither reason nor passion. He 
cannot abandon reason given his view of the faculty as a fundamental ability to classify sense 
perceptions--one that humans share with animals even though humans are superior to animals, and 
some humans are superior to other humans (Philosophy 48). He cannot abandon passion given his view 
that passion is the mover to action (Philosophy 78; "Pulpit" 463-64). But if Campbell designs a rhetorical 
theory with the needs of preachers in mind, then we may ask what practical circumstances motivated 
his theoretical choices.  
 A prima facie case for the importance of religion in Campbell's theorizing about rhetoric may be 
made by considering his publications and vocation. Besides Philosophy of Rhetoric, almost all of 
Campbell's published work is religious.10 In his own time he was best known for his A Dissertation on 
Miracles (1762). His most ambitious scholarly project was The Four Gospels (1789), a translation of the 
Gospels with a lengthy introduction and copious notes. He also published a number of sermons. In 1741 
he attended divinity lectures in Edinburgh and later was a theology student under professors at King's 
and Marischal Colleges in Aberdeen. Campbell, with other students, organized the theological club; one 
of Campbell's contemporaries described Campbell as "the life and soul of the society" (Keith ix). 
Campbell received his license to preach in 1746. He served as Principal and Professor of Divinity of 
Marischal College. He regularly lectured and preached until close to the time of his death in 1796. His 
Lectures on Ecclesiastical History, Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence, and Lectures on 
the Pastoral Character were published after his death. Campbell's occupation and preoccupations are 
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good reasons for believing that the view of rhetoric he advocates in Philosophy of Rhetoric is shaped in 
part by religious concerns. Campbell wants to advocate a moderate preaching style and defend the 
authority of revealed religion. 
 
Campbell as Teacher of Preachers 
 Purpose and audience help to account for a thinker's positions on whether preachers ought to 
use emotional appeals and, if so, what emotions ought to be evoked or invoked, and how. Is the aim to 
advocate particular doctrines, to move a congregation to do what they already know should be done, to 
convert non-religious persons, persons of a related faith, persons of a radically different faith? Does the 
preacher aim to distinguish herself and members of her congregation from competitors and, if so, what 
kinds of emotional performances may be a mark of distinction? Since Campbell was Professor of Divinity 
at Marischal College in Aberdeen, he was directly involved in training future ministers in the Church of 
Scotland. Among the topics he lectured on as part of a broader program of training ministers was 
preaching, or pulpit eloquence. He includes advice on preaching in lectures on other topics and in 
sermons delivered to fellow ministers. These sources provide insight into his religious purposes. 
 Like other Moderates in the Kirk, Campbell was concerned about the so-called Popular party 
within the Church of Scotland, other Protestant evangelicals such as John Wesley, and Jacobite 
challenges.11 Briefly, anti-Moderates tended to use a more emotional, less polished preaching style due 
in part to a different conception of purpose--not edification so much as conversion and salvation. 
Likewise, Protestant evangelicals such as George Whitefield used a more emotional preaching style. 
These forces, coupled with Catholic strongholds in the highlands and islands and the 1745 Jacobite 
Rebellion, contributed to Moderate fears of challenges to the religious and political status quo. Upon 
these circumstances are based Campbell's views of, first, the needs of congregations and, second, the 
conduct of preachers. 
 Although Campbell describes preaching as "the great means of conversion as well as of 
edification" ("Pulpit" 354), his advice focuses less on converting than edifying or, as he puts it, "the 
reformation of mankind" ("Pulpit" 377). Lukewarmness does not accomplish this; in the course of 
defending the study of eloquence against the charge that it is dangerous, Campbell mentions a preacher 
he knew who was "long the aversion of the populace, on account of his dulness, awkwardness, and 
coldness" (Philosophy 11). Nor does enthusiasm; Campbell notes that "there is no pitch of brutality and 
rapacity to which the passions of avarice and ambition, consecrated and inflamed by religious 
enthusiasm, will not drive mankind," and remarks that "even in our own time, have we not seen new 
factions raised by popular declaimers, whose only merit was impudence, whose only engine of influence 
was calumny and self-praise, whose only moral lesson was malevolence" (Philosophy 109).12 
 Instead Campbell recommends what may be described as a warm, gentle kind of persuasion. 
Describing how style ought to be "affecting," Campbell observes: "It is indeed that warmth, and gentle 
emotion in the address and language, which serves to show, that the speaker is much in earnest in what 
he says, and is actuated to say it from the tenderest concern for the welfare of his hearers" ("Pulpit" 
376; see also 378). Again, discussing the "pathetic" sermon, Campbell recommends that "the pathos 
excited by the preacher, ought ever to be accompanied with, and chastened by, piety, submission and 
charity. At the same time, that it conveys both light and heat to the soul, it is pure and inoffensive; like 
that wherein God appeared to Moses in the bush which burned, but was not consumed" ("Pulpit" 394). 
Or, to take a final example, Campbell says that in a pathetic sermon "for disposing a congregation to a 
suitable commemoration of the sufferings of our Lord, in the sacrament of the supper, or Eucharist" the 
aim 
is to operate on all the grateful and devout affections of the heart, and to put his hearers, I may say, in a 
proper frame of spirit for discharging the duty for which they are assembled, in such a reverend and 
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pious manner, as may produce the best effect upon their minds, and tend most to the edification and 
confirmation of themselves and others. ("Pulpit" 460-61). 
As Walzer has aptly noted about this passage: "This is not a description of an effect that we ordinarily 
associate with passionate rhetoric" (Campbell 120). 
 Even in cases where a rhetor arouses a stronger emotion like fear, it must be reasonable. As 
Campbell puts it when he distinguishes between the fear of the superstitious and the fear of the 
religious: 
There is a fear that is reasonable and proper; there is a fear that is unreasonable and weak. [. . . W]e 
even read it in our frame, that all the inferior powers of the soul should be informed by reason, and 
controuled by conscience. The evil then only takes place, when the passion, emancipating itself, and 
disdaining all restraint and controul, is directed towards an improper object, or cherished in an undue 
degree. ("Spirit" 321-22) 
Campbell's account of an appropriate preaching style based on the needs of the congregation indicates 
that for Campbell emotional appeals ought to be tempered in some way, whether by the kind of 
emotion appealed to or by reason. Moreover, Campbell places a higher premium on appeals to reason 
than appeals to emotion. 
 Campbell's rhetorical theory is also shaped by his view of appropriate conduct for preachers.13 
One of his contemporaries offers this account of Campbell's aims in training students of divinity: "Upon 
the whole, Dr Campbell appears to have been a liberal-minded man in the proper sense of that word, it 
being his ambition to breed up a learned, accomplished, faithful clergy, who should steer equally clear of 
enthusiasm and lukewarmness" (Ramsay 1: 490). Campbell advocates a preaching style that 
distinguishes moderate preachers from both the superstitious and enthusiastic. About the latter he 
asserts:  
To head a sect, to infuse party-spirit, to make men arrogant, uncharitable, and malevolent, is the easiest 
task imaginable, and to which almost any blockhead is fully equal. But to produce the contrary effect, to 
subdue the spirit of faction, and that monster spiritual pride, with which it is invariably accompanied, to 
inspire equity, moderation, and charity into men's sentiments and conduct with regard to others, is the 
genuine test of eloquence. (Philosophy 110) 
Campbell advises those who want to claim Christian morality to have a command of their passions 
(Systematic 175; Keith lxxv). He advises students of divinity to beware of overzealous passion in others 
and to preserve moderation in themselves. As he puts it in his lectures on systematic theology:  
It is extremely difficult to preserve moderation, when one is opposed with bigotry; or evenness of 
temper, when one is encountered with fury.  The love of victory is but too apt to supplant in our breasts 
the love of knowledge, and in the confusion, dust and smoke, raised by the combatants, both sides often 
lose sight of the truth.  These considerations are not mentioned to deter any of you from this part of the 
study, but to excite all of you to come to it properly prepared, candid, circumspect, modest, attentive, 
and cool. (21) 
In fact he recommends that students not pay much attention to matters of controversy since these 
disrupt the temper of moderation: attending to controversy is 
a method which would tend only to form a habit of turning every thing into matter of wrangling and 
logomachy, those noxious weeds, those briars and thorns with which almost all the walks of theology 
have been so unhappily pestered. In my judgment, a habit of this kind greatly hurts the rational powers, 
when in appearance it only exercises them; it doth worse, it often greatly injures an ingenuous and 
candid temper; it infects one with a rage of disputation, the cacoethes of pedants; it inclines the mind to 
hunt more for the specious than the solid, and in the ardour of the combat to sacrifice truth to victory. 
(Systematic 95-6; see also 194) 
 Campbell understands his featuring of more reasonable, gentler emotions as a way for 
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moderate preachers not only to distinguish themselves from competitors but, significantly, to achieve 
and maintain peace and union more generally. Consider how Campbell contrasts Christian zeal with the 
zeal of sects: 
There is in it an ardour for the truth, not that men may be either allured or terrified into a verbal 
profession of what they do not in their hearts believe, (the grossest insult that can be offered to truth), 
but that they may attain a rational conviction. The interests of truth itself it desires to promote for a still 
further end; that by means of it, love may be kindled both to God and man: that by means of it, 
temperance, and justice, and piety, and peace, may flourish on the earth. ("Spirit" 402) 
He continues the description:  
Candid in judging, and warmed with kindness, she [zeal] always aims at union, assiduously promoting 
peace. She understands the import of moderation and mutual forbearance, and can cordially receive as 
brethren persons who differ in some sentiments; avoiding matters of doubtful disputation, and 
whatever a cause of stumbling might prove to the weak. ("Spirit" 406-7).   
Campbell asserts that the enthusiast is characterized "by the extravagancies of a heated brain" ("Spirit" 
338) and describes the harmful consequences: "Weak judgment and ungovernable passions may give 
rise to those differences that breed division; but when sects are once formed, political causes co-
operate in producing that malignity which they so commonly bear to one another" ("Spirit" 425). 
 It may not be overstating the case to say that for Campbell the cure to religious and 
concomitant kinds of disorder is an ordered mind. In his sermon on the spirit of the Gospel Campbell 
analyzes the character of true religion into the spirit of power, of love, and of a sound mind. 
Significantly, he chooses to focus on a sound mind because "it has been less attended to, and [. . .] this 
inattention has been the source even of those evils which have affected the other parts of the 
character" (341). According to Campbell neither the superstitious nor enthusiastic has "a sound mind" 
("Spirit" 338). Campbell defines a sound mind as follows: 
A sound mind is here opposed to a frantic or disordered imagination, wherein the light of reason is 
obscured, if not extinguished, by the terrors of superstition, or the arrogance of fanaticism. Nor is there 
any lineament whereby True Religion may be more perfectly distinguished from every pretender which 
falsely assumes her name, than this good sense, or soundness of mind, that gives the finishing to her 
character. ("Spirit" 341-42) 
Campbell's call for order in the mind and his concern that enthusiasm disrupts this order is a counterpart 
to the moderate fear that evangelism would revive fanaticism and disorder; his preoccupation with 
preaching may be explained in part by a desire to regenerate morality to maintain national order (Sher 
31-2, 44). Again, we see that Campbell puts a premium upon reason in preaching. 
 
Campbell as Defender of Revealed Religion 
 Emotional appeals may intersect with the interpretation of sacred texts in ways such as the 
following. If a rhetorician considers the spiritual to be more a matter of feeling than doctrine, then 
sacred texts may be ignored, or treatments of sacred texts may focus less on interpretation or focus 
interpretation on the religious emotions solicited. If a rhetorician puts a premium on reason as Campbell 
does, then issues involving interpretation may include: are multiple interpretations acceptable; if so, 
how do we generate them; if not, how do we decide which is true? If not just the interpretation but the 
nature and authenticity of sacred texts are at issue, then their reason and emotionality may be 
marshaled as evidence for or against a given position. Are sacred texts best understood as testimonial 
evidence about matters of fact or as persuasive documents?14 Moreover, sacred texts may be 
interpreted in a way that aims to cultivate particular kinds of emotional displays.  
 Campbell's purpose of defending the authority of revealed religion helps to shape his view of 
emotional appeals and his assumptions about reason and emotion. First, Campbell wants to maintain a 
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need for scripture--to argue that religious truths exist in the Bible and not just in the "book of Nature," 
for example (Lectures 357). Early in the eighteenth century century Deists challenged the authority of 
revealed religion. Theological debates of the preceding age--debates which had resulted in persecution 
and violence--had lead them to believe that it would be wise "to substitute reason and nature for 
dogmas and creeds [. . . .] The unseemly and inconclusive wrangles about the meaning of Scripture had 
discredited the Bible as a court of appeal" (Cragg 65). Deists questioned whether the Bible was the word 
of God revealed directly to humans; if everything coming from God is perfect, then why is the style of 
the Gospel writers so rude, barbarous, and faulty? One historian has described this issue as "the heart of 
the matter" and discussions of it as "that mountain of literature (now largely obsolete) in which a few 
challenged, and many defended, the authenticity, consistency, and inherent probability of the Bible as 
the direct word of God" (Stromberg 62). 
 That Campbell continued to worry about deists even at this late date is apparent from his 
lectures on systematic theology. In Lecture V Campbell says that students do not need to worry much 
about controversy, but he does recommend attention to some, the first of which is deistic controversies. 
In the preface to The Four Gospels, Campbell objects to the claim that through reason alone it is possible 
to discover truths of consequence to humans: 
The fact is nearly the reverse: for except those things which pass within our own minds, and which we 
learn solely from what is called consciousness, and except the deductions made from self-evident or 
mathematical axioms, all our information relating to fact, or existence of any kind, is from without. [. . .] 
Reason is the eye of the mind: it is in consequence of our possessing it, that we are susceptible either of 
religion or of law. Now the light by which the mental eye is informed, comes also from without, and 
consists chiefly in testimony, human or divine. (Four iii) 
As he asks in "The Spirit of the Gospel," "Will the bright doctrines of revelation be found to have any 
coincidence with the discoveries we can make by the twilight of our natural faculties" (342). He holds 
that reason is not the standard of truth; instead, "it is, primarily, no more than the test or the 
touchstone of evidence, and, in a secondary sense only, the standard of truth" (Four ii). Campbell 
considers the truths revealed in scripture to be evidence or matters of fact and in matters of fact, he 
argues, "the proper province of [reason], lies in comparing and judging the proofs brought before it, not 
in supplying from invention any deficiency in these" (Four 237; see also 238, 264, Philosophy 62-3). 
 This points to a second purpose: Campbell wants to constrain interpretations of scripture. The 
mistaken belief that reason can generate truths has, for Campbell, led people to look to the Bible to 
confirm their beliefs--or, put differently, to invent arguments to support false doctrine--rather than to 
simply see the truths revealed there:  
Each would exercise his ingenuity in giving such a turn to the dictates of revelation as would make them 
appear conformable to his favourite opinions, and would conciliate both, where they appeared to clash. 
When the rein is once given to Fancy, she is not easily curbed even in her wildest excursions. Subtle and 
inventive heads would be daily publishing their own visions as the oracles of God. ("Spirit" 356) 
Put simply, "It is not every specious deduction by inference from Scripture, that ought to be put on the 
same footing with those doctrines which are clearly revealed there" ("Spirit" 409). Since this kind of 
thinking can lead to different parties or sects, since Campbell wants to promote unity, and although he 
continues to put a premium upon reason, Campbell chooses to view reason as a relatively weak, limited, 
and passive faculty. 
 Third, since Campbell wants to consider the truths revealed through scripture to be matters of 
fact, he wants to classify the Gospels as testimonial evidence (Philosophy 56)--not as attempts to 
persuade readers. By conceiving of the Gospels as evidence, Campbell again aims to constrain 
interpretations. The Gospel writers do not make arguments that may be interpreted in multiple ways or 
hold multiple meanings. Instead, they simply testify to matters of fact. Campbell therefore needs to 
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argue that there is an absence of persuasive design. For Campbell this means that absent must be 
arguments and emotional appeals. Commenting on the Gospel of Luke, Campbell asserts: "A simple 
narration of the facts is given; but no attempt is made, by argument, asservation, or animated 
expression, to bias the understanding, or work upon the passions. The naked truth is left to its own 
native evidence. The writers betray no suspicion of its insufficiency" (Four 98; see also 31). Regarding 
the Gospel writers' style of reporting miracles Campbell observes: "In one uniform strain they record the 
most signal miracles, and the most ordinary events. [. . .] Equally certain of the facts advanced, they 
recite both in the same unvaried tone, as faithful witnesses, whose business it was to testify, and not to 
argue" (Four 34). According to Campbell the Gospel narratives exclude "that quality of style which is 
called animation" (Four 34)--one of the sources of emotional appeals that he identifies in Philosophy of 
Rhetoric (215). In addition, he asserts: "The historian invariably preserves the same equable tenor, never 
betraying the smallest degree of warmth against any person, or attempting to prepossess the minds, or 
work upon the passions, of his readers" (Four 45). Since even "the smallest degree of warmth against 
any person" is not apparent, the principle of sympathy is not involved--another source of emotional 
appeals that he identifies in Philosophy of Rhetoric (131). And he suggests that even though the facts 
may arouse emotion, they are not designed to: 
In displaying the most gracious, as well as marvellous, dispensation of Providence towards man, all is 
directed to mend his heart, nothing to move his pity, or kindle his resentment. If these effects be also 
produced, they are manifestly the consequences of the naked exposition of the facts, and not of any 
adventitious art in the writers, nay not of any one term, not otherwise necessary, employed for the 
purpose. (Four 35) 
 Apparent absence of persuasive design not only helps Campbell to classify the Gospels as 
evidence but also enables him to highlight the credibility of the Gospel writers. Campbell holds that the 
Gospels lack the human art of rhetoric in order "that the excellency of the power, to the conviction of 
every impartial spectator, might be of God, and not of man" ("Success" 66).15 Campbell asserts about 
the Gospel writers that "what has hitherto been found invariably to mark the character of fanatics and 
enthusiasts of all religions, we do not discover in them a single trace. Their narratives demonstrate them 
to have been men of sound minds and cool reflection" (Four 36; see also 275). Thus Campbell aims to 
cultivate this kind of disposition in readers. 
 
Campbell on Emotional Appeals in Philosophy of Rhetoric 
 Campbell's aims to train future ministers and to defend the authority of revealed religion 
intersect with and shape his treatment of emotional appeals in Philosophy of Rhetoric. Since these aims 
involve treating emotion as something that ought to be tempered either by appealing to gentle 
emotions or to reason, Campbell conceives of emotional appeals as practically inseparable from reason. 
And since these aims also involve constraining interpretations of scripture, Campbell conceives of both 
reason and passion as relatively passive faculties. 
 Campbell's conception of emotional appeals may be analyzed into the invention and 
presentation of emotional appeals. This division is compatible not only with the traditional canons of 
rhetoric but also with how Campbell describes the orator's art: unlike architects who can design but not 
execute their own plans, "it is equally incumbent on the orator to design and execute" (Philosophy 170). 
The following explication of Campbell's conception of emotional appeals in Philosophy of Rhetoric 
highlights three main points. First, both reason and emotion are relatively passive faculties--an 
appealing theoretical position given Campbell's desire to constrain scriptural interpretations. Second, 
emotional appeals are inventible or designed--not unrehearsed or spontaneous externalizations of 
internal states that may promote disorder. This position helps rhetors design emotional appeals 
tempered by reason since their design involves marshalling evidence. It also helps rhetors to distinguish 
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themselves from those who put a premium on emotional displays. Further, it helps to bolster the 
authority of revealed religion; God speaks to humans through the Bible rather than through the 
enthusiastic, spontaneous ravings of an unsound mind. Third, both the invention and presentation of 
emotional appeals are practically inseparable from reason. Thus rhetors may avoid the extremes of 
lukewarmness and enthusiasm, and work to maintain religious, social, and political order. 
 Campbell holds that reason and emotion are universal faculties of mind and that their 
operations are similar in fundamental ways. Campbell holds that appeals to both faculties are not 
relative to time, culture, and so on; he speculates that we may discover that people around the globe 
both argue and feel in much the same way (34; see also 37). In addition, both reason and passion 
operate by principles of association (129). Moreover, both are passive. Passions are operated upon, and 
for Campbell reason is a relatively passive, mechanical faculty that automatically compares and classifies 
sense data, sometimes without individuals even being aware of the process. We are more likely to call 
our mind's motion "reasoning" when we are conscious of its motion (48-49). These assumptions assist 
Campbell's purpose of constraining interpretations of scripture. If reason is a passive faculty that 
operates naturally and predictably in response to sense data, then it ought not be used to generate 
multiple interpretations but to simply illuminate what is. And if the operations of reason and passion are 
universal, then multiple acceptable interpretations over time or across cultures or among sects are not 
possible. 
 Despite the passive nature of reason and passion, Campbell holds that emotional appeals may 
be invented. In Philosophy of Rhetoric Campbell presents what may be described as a topical inventional 
system for emotional appeals in his list of "circumstances that are chiefly instrumental in operating on 
the Passions" (81). The circumstances are probability, plausibility, importance, proximity of time, 
connection of place, relation to the persons concerned, and interest in the consequences. The more 
probable, plausible, important, and so on the circumstance, the more it excites passion. This is a system 
of topical invention in the sense of "loci" or places where arguments are stored analogous to ciceronian 
systems of invention. As one could run through the loci for, say, a person's circumstances to develop a 
prosecution or defense case--birth, friendships, children, relations, connections, resources, and so on--
one may run through the seven circumstances to invent emotional appeals. The seven circumstances do 
not work as topics in the Aristotelian sense of statements of probability and, as Walzer has put it, they 
do not "serve as premises in apodictic proof" ("Campbell" 82; Campbell 81). But viewed as "places" they 
do work like a place system of invention used to invent emotional appeals based in probability and 
inseparable from reason. 
 Their inseparability from reason may be illustrated by recalling that to use a "place" system of 
topical invention, it is essential to have facts to "fill" the places. For Campbell the facts include the 
different kinds of evidence discussed in Chapter V of Book I (experience, analogy, testimony, and 
calculation of chances). In his discussion of the seven circumstances, Campbell notes ways that different 
kinds of evidence may be used with respect to different topics. For example, probability results from 
evidence (81), experience or testimony may need to be supplied in cases where plausibility is 
improbable (82, 84, 87), and so on. The orator may run through the places and "select those 
circumstances that are favourable to his own plea, or which excite the passion that is directly 
instrumental in promoting his end" (275). Significantly, then, for Campbell emotional appeals are 
inventible--they may be designed.16 
 Their inseparability from reason may be even more apparent when we recall that Campbell 
refers to his chapter on evidence as being designed to accomplish the second step of persuasion--appeal 
to reason (274-75). And Campbell remarks at the end of the section on the seven circumstances that 
"pleading the importance and the other pathetic circumstances, or pleading the authority of opinions or 
precedents [to excite auxiliary passions], is usually considered, and aptly enough, as being likewise a 
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species of reasoning" (92). So intertwined are reason and emotion in Campbell's account of emotional 
appeals that speakers cannot achieve persuasion if they attain "the pathetic without the rational" or 
"the rational without the pathetic" (78). In fact, vehemence--"the supreme qualification of the orator" 
(4)--results when the argumentative and the pathetic are interwoven. Thus for Campbell emotional 
appeals ought to be tempered by reason--a product of conscious reflection rather than a spontaneous 
outburst, a crafting of public character rather than an externalization of an internal state. 
 The tie of emotional appeals to reason is also apparent from Campbell's discussion of the 
presentation of emotional appeals. Campbell recommends three main ways of presenting emotional 
appeals. First, rhetors can use descriptive language to call to auditors' minds sense data that cause an 
emotional response. In Campbell's view it would be best if orators could bring auditors to directly 
witness the circumstances because he holds that "[a] passion is most strongly excited by sensation" (81). 
The next best case would be to help them recall circumstances they had witnessed because he holds 
that, after sensations, ideas of memory most strongly excite passion. In lieu of these, an orator must 
make due with using language to help auditors imagine the circumstances or, as Campbell puts it, to 
"make the ideas he summons up in the imaginations of his hearers, resemble, in lustre and steadiness, 
those of sensation and remembrance" (81) and to "make every aggravating circumstance be, as it were, 
both perceived and felt by them" (92). 
 Although this account suggests that for Campbell circumstances themselves naturally excite 
passion, it is noteworthy that he describes the presentational design of such an appeal in terms of an 
enthymeme: 
In the enthymeme, (the syllogism of orators, as Quintilian terms it,) employed in such cases, the 
sentiment that such a quality or circumstance ought to rouse such a passion, though the foundation of 
all, is generally assumed without proof, or even without mention. This forms the major proposition, 
which is suppressed as obvious. His whole art is exerted in evincing the minor, which is the antecedent 
in his argument, and which maintains the reality of those attendant circumstances in the case in hand. 
(92) 
In short, the major proposition is: If these circumstances exist, then you ought to feel this passion; the 
minor proposition affirms the antecedent: These circumstances exist; and the conclusion is: You ought 
to feel this passion. The major premise, according to Campbell, "we must learn originally from feeling, 
not from argument" (92), a position Campbell explicitly links to divine design in his lectures on 
systematic theology: 
God hath not left the discovery of practical truths, or what regards our duty, in the same way, as those 
truths that are of a theoretic nature, to the slow and precarious deductions of the rational faculty; but 
has in our consciences given such clear intimations of what is right and amiable in conduct, that where 
there have been no prejudices to occupy the mind, and pervert the natural sense of things, it commands 
an immediate and instinctive approbation. (181-82)17 
Although for Campbell the major premise is not founded in reason, the appeal as a whole is designed 
and presented with a particular version of reasoning in mind. 
 In addition to descriptive language, emotional appeals may also be designed in a way that takes 
advantage of the principle of sympathy which, for Campbell, is a quality of the soul or principle of 
communication by means of which passions are communicated from orator to auditor (131, 15).18 As he 
puts it: "It is by sympathy that we rejoice with them that rejoice, and weep with them that weep" (131); 
sympathy is "a reflected feeling" (89). Orators can design appeals that make use of the principle of 
sympathy by using figures that serve as external signs of internal states. According to Campbell, 
exclamation, apostrophe, and interrogation, for example, enliven ideas through the principle of 
sympathy (94). Although for Campbell emotional appeals based on this principle do not involve 
reasoning, this principle, like all of his explanatory principles, is inventional.19  
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 Third, emotional appeals may be comprised of figures to animate the mind. Campbell advises 
the orator who "purposes to work upon the passions [that] his very diction, as well as his sentiments, 
must be animated" (215). Correction, climax, and vision, he explains, "tend greatly to enliven the ideas, 
by the implicit, but animated comparison and opposition conveyed in them. Implicit and indirect 
comparison is more suitable to the disturbed state of mind required by the pathetic, than that which is 
explicit and direct. The latter implies leisure and tranquility, the former rapidity and fire" (94). These 
figures are "adapted to the pathetic," and the mind's action at least in these cases is comparing--the key 
action involved in Campbell's conception of reasoning (48-49). 
 In short, Campbell's religious concerns help to explain why in Philosophy of Rhetoric he 
conceives of reason and passion as universal, passive faculties; and why his account of presenting and 
inventing emotional appeals puts a premium upon reason and its inseparability from passion. 
  
Conclusions 
 Campbell's account of the invention and presentation of emotional appeals in Philosophy of 
Rhetoric is shaped by the purposes of advocating a moderate style of preaching and of defending the 
authority of revealed religion. The seven circumstances in Philosophy of Rhetoric may be understood as 
a "place" system of invention that works like ancient ciceronian systems but modifies the places 
themselves. Campbell needed to alter classical models in part because the classical models were not 
designed for religious occasions. As he tells students in his lectures on pulpit eloquence, "my intention [. 
. . is] to assist you in applying [ancient critics' and orators'] rules and examples to cases so different from 
those with which alone they were concerned" (454). Certainly Campbell would also want to alter 
classical models in order to keep pace with the intellectual currents of the new philosophy.20 But as this 
study shows, Campbell's orientation toward inventing emotional appeals is different from that of 
classical models due in part to different kinds of purposes. Campbell does not offer an inventional 
system oriented toward the classical ideal of copious eloquence as a way of managing uncertainty. 
Instead, as we have seen, Campbell wants to constrain possible interpretations in the interest of 
maintaining order. Conceiving of reason and passion as relatively passive limits what rhetors can see and 
say. Conceiving of reason and passion as inseparable and moderate limits the possibilities for advocating 
change. It also enables Campbell and like-minded preachers and auditors to distinguish themselves from 
competitors and identify with each other through emotional performances. These implications coincide 
with Campbell's practical purposes. If social and political disorder are understood to be caused by 
disordered minds, then it seems appropriate to adapt classical systems of invention to a theory of 
rhetoric grounded in using language to affect faculties of mind. 
 This study suggests that the place of emotional appeals in theories of rhetoric ought to be 
considered not only in philosophical or broad cultural contexts but also in the context of the theorist's 
work as a whole and, at least in cases where a theorist has clear ties to a religious organization or 
movement, in a religious context. It suggests the need to consider a theorist's practical purposes and 
audiences, perhaps as a preacher preaching to the choir, converting so-called heathens or members of a 
related denomination, or reawakening religious fervor in one's own; or perhaps as a theologian 
generating or constraining scriptural interpretations. And it has aimed to enhance our understanding of 
Campbell's theory of rhetoric, of the potential nature and status of emotional appeals in theories of 
rhetoric and of their potential intersections with religion; and reaffirmed some basic guidelines for 
studying the history of rhetorical traditions. 
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1 Gross has recently made a similar point about emotions, arguing for an understanding of emotions as social and 
rhetorical rather than individual and psychological. Clark has discussed how landscapes can assert a religious 
identity and perform rhetorical functions in a secular national culture. 
2 I do not focus on his conception of passions as such; Walzer has discussed it in "Campbell" and Campbell, ch. 6. 
3 For example Shuger has detailed the relationship between reason and passion in Renaissance sacred rhetorics, 
and Kastely has discussed the status of emotion in rhetorical traditions more broadly. 
4 According to Corrigan, some scholars in religious studies have posited that emotion is the "essential, irreducible 
component of religion, one that cannot be analyzed into its parts, parsed, as it were, into nonreligious artifacts" 
(5). 
5 The most recent discussions of the issue hold that Campbell offers a theory of reception (Walzer, Campbell 103) 
or management of the discursive communication of mental impressions (Miller 219) rather than a theory of 
invention or production. Similarly, others have described Campbell's view of invention as an "attenuation" of 
traditional classical inventional systems (Bevilacqua, "Campbell" 94, "Philosophical" 5, 7); "as much a spirit and 
point of view as [. . .] any specific body of rules and precepts" (Ehninger, "Old Friends" 267, "Revisited" 176); and 
as "based on association psychology" (Crowley 12; see also 15-16). Scholars have variously described the 
inventional problem that Campbell addressed as "how previously derived arguments and appeals might most 
effectively be employed in influencing those particular persons toward whom the discourse was directed" 
(Ehninger, "Revolution" 273) and "discovering the means of enlivening ideas" (Bitzer, "Hume's" 158). More 
recently scholars have argued that Campbell replaced traditional inventional systems with a "preoccupation with 
the Sublime, beauty, novelty, propriety, and the like" (Warnick 11) and a conception of eloquence "as a fulcrum 
that enables us to balance thought and language in order to achieve the ends of discourse" (Ulman 107). 
6 Walzer has asserted that Campbell's "assumption that reason cannot establish a hierarchy of values [. . .] 
responds to the historical conditions of [the] eighteenth century when an emerging democracy made societal 
agreements problematic as wider participation brought to the surface differences in basic values that seemed 
irreconcilable by reasoned argument" ("Campbell" 84). Miller (206-07) has made a similar point. 
7 This may be the most fully developed area of Campbell scholarship. Scholars have argued that Campbell's 
sources include Bacon, Hume, Reid, and Scottish Common Sense philosophy more generally (see for example 
Benoit; Bevilacqua, "Philosophical"; Bitzer, "Hume's"; Bormann; Mohrmann; Edney; Miller 154-55). 
8 A similar point has been made by Walzer, Campbell 5; Suderman 5, 249; and Conley 217, 219. Suderman has 
suggested that Campbell's rhetoric may have shaped his religious principles when he describes the relationship 
between The Four Gospels and Philosophy of Rhetoric: "The translation of the four canonical Gospels was a 
practical working out of the philosophical and rhetorical principles found in The Philosophy of Rhetoric" (147). 
Certainly it is not implausible that Campbell's rhetoric shaped his thinking about religious issues and 
circumstances. In this essay however I focus on his rhetorical theory as a way of addressing a rhetorical situation 
because, based on the argument to follow, I think in this case it is the primary direction of influence. 
9 The apparent tension between this position and his analysis of persuasion--first appeal to passion and then 
judgment (Philosophy 77-78)--may be resolved by the account of the inseparability of reason and passion in 
inventing and presenting emotional appeals as described below in the discussion of Campbell on emotional 
appeals. 
10 An exception is the anonymous Defence of the conduct of Marischal College, in relation to the present scheme of 
union, against the attack made on it by the Principal and six professors of King's College.  In a letter to a friend.  By 
a member of Marischal College, which Fieser notes has been ascribed to Campbell (47; see also Suderman 25). 
The biographical information that follows comes from Keith and Suderman chs. 1-3; Bitzer, "Introduction" viii-xviii 
and Walzer, Campbell, ch. 1 also provide biographical information. For a brief overview of his life and work by one 
of his contemporaries, see Ramsay 1: 482-501. 
11 Sher has described Aberdeen as a "Moderate stronghold" and Campbell as a clergyman-academic with 
Moderate inclinations (126). The following discussion is based on Matheson (ch. 4) who has detailed Evangelical 
Manolescu, Beth Innocenti. "Religious Reasons for Campbell's View of Emotional Appeals in Philosophy of Rhetoric." Rhetoric Society 





                                                                                                                                                                                                            
and Moderate preaching styles using the writings of Campbell's contemporaries; Drummond and Bulloch (chs. 3-
5) who discuss Evangelicals and Moderates more generally; Sher who focuses on Moderates in Edinburgh; 
Fawcett who has discussed the beginnings of Evangelism in Scotland; and McIntosh who has discussed the 
theology of the Popular party. Brown 17-31 has briefly overviewed Presbyterian dissent during the eighteenth 
century. 
12 A distrust of religious enthusiasm characterized the moderate literati more generally (Sher 8). Cragg has 
described enthusiasm as "the bête noire of the age" (30). 
13 Gellis (132-34) and Walzer (Campbell 115-16) have noted correspondences between Campbell's discussion of 
the syllogism, how he argues, and how he criticizes how others argue on religious issues. 
14 Accounts of the kinds and strength of evidence available to rhetors may address the need to defend religious 
texts as evidence or to defend the evidence presented by religious texts. Miracle arguments, for example, depend 
upon reasoning from experience and testimony: are those who testify to witnessing miracles credible, are events 
contrary to experience provable by testimony? Bitzer ("Indian") details the miracle arguments of Campbell, Hume, 
and others; he and others have noted correspondences between Campbell's theory of evidence and his religious 
purposes (Bitzer, "Introduction" xlviii, "Religious" 9-10; Suderman 249; Walzer, Campbell 114-15). 
15 The need to distinguish between human rhetoric and the word of God helps to account for Campbell's hard and 
fast distinction between thought and language in Philosophy of Rhetoric; it enables him to claim that his 
translation of the Gospels changes only the language of revelation--not its substance (Manolescu, "Campbell's" 
112). 
16 Compare Howell who argues that instead of traditional topical invention Campbell "stressed [. . .] that rhetorical 
subject matter must come from intellection, consciousness, common sense, experience, analogy, and testimony" 
(602); Bitzer who argues that Campbell assigned to invention "the essentially empirical mission of accurately 
drawing knowledge from observation and experience" ("Introduction" xxix); and Walzer who argues that 
Campbell offers "seven ways to increase a passion in lieu of a topical theory of invention" ("Campbell" 84). 
17 As Bitzer has observed, Campbell's religious commitments explain why in Philosophy of Rhetoric Campbell 
"never speaks of reasoning that establishes an ought or any moral term whatever" ("Religious" 13). 
18 Sympathy in Campbell has been discussed at more length by Bator and Walzer, Campbell 84-88. 
19 Campbell observes that discovering principles of human nature that explain rhetorical precepts will aid 
invention or, as he puts it, "a more thorough investigation of the latent energies [. . .] whereby the instruments 
employed by eloquence produce their effect upon the hearers" will "enrich the fancy" such that "the proper 
mediums are suggested, whereby the necessary aids of topics, arguments, illustrations, and motives may be 
procured" (Philosophy lxxiv). 
20 Howell has noted "Campbell's strong sympathy for the new rhetoric, and for the new logic as well" (610) in 
Campbell's lectures on pulpit eloquence. 
